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The Rule of Law and Access to Justice in Prisons 

Good afternoon.  

It is an honour and a pleasure to be speaking to you this 
afternoon. And after a truly wonderful weekend I hope it will be 
the first of many visits. My particular thanks to Prof Bacik for 
the invitation to be here.  

My topic is the rule of law and access to justice in prisons. At 
the heart of my talk is the concept of accountability, along with 
the importance of fairness and transparency in decisions taken in 
places which are very far from public view. The rule of law is 
ever more important in situations where the power relationship 
is tipped in the favour of the State, as in prisons. Speaking 
pragmatically, the fairness and legitimacy of decision-making in 
prisons is an important element in maintaining order and decent 
relationships between staff and prisoners, so essential in 
ensuring security. This practical reason for the application of the 
rule of law in prisons has been recognised by reports into 
disturbances in prison, such as the Woolf Report in to the 
Strangeways riots.  

I would like to examine four main ways in which access to 
justice in our prisons is deficient, some of the decisions on the 
topic, and to make some proposals for improving the situation. 
The topic of accountability and the rule of law in prisons is 
especially timely in light of the publication of the report into the 
death of Gary Douch this week.  

The Rule of Law and Access to Justice in Irish and 
Convention law 

The decision to send a person to prison is only the beginning of 
many more decisions which can have a profound effect not only 
on the daily life of a prisoner, but also on their prospects upon 
release, which affects all of us. The decision whether to grant a 
parent temporary release to attend a major event in the life of his 
or her child, the decision to allow a prisoner to attend a 
relative’s funeral, to permit a prisoner to transfer to an open 
prison, the decision to remove a prisoner from a particular 
course of rehabilitative treatment, to place a prisoner on 
protection, or to remove him or her from the rest of prison 
population, are all highly consequential.  

The question of the extent to which procedural fairness or the 
rules of natural and constitutional justice apply in these 
situations has been given relatively limited attention by the Irish 
courts. There is a fundamental point here about access to justice 
in that our prison law and prisoners’ rights jurisprudence has 
been rather underdeveloped, much less developed than that of 
the United Kingdom. There are many reasons for this, including 
the absence of legal aid, the high proportion of short sentences 
within our system, a lack of understanding of the possibilities of 
prison law amongst practitioners, and I include myself In that, 
and, though this has not been formally studied here, [it has 
elsewhere] possible concern about negative consequences for 
prisoners taking cases. It is unfortunate that our courts have not 
had more opportunity to lay down principles concerning the rule 
of law in prison. I think we are where the ECTHR was in the 
90s in terms of the matters with which we have grappled, 
though there are many islands of hope.  

I would like to address four specific areas which require a brave 
and full-bodied application of the principles of the rule of law in 
the prison context. These are: decisions on temporary release, 
decisions to restrict physical contact and visits generally  and the 
regulation of complaints made by prisoners. I had not intended 
to discuss the investigation of deaths in custody, but in light of 
recent events, I feel compelled to address it.  

Decisions on temporary release 

Temporary release is a mechanism whereby a prisoner can be 
released from prison before the expiration of his or her sentence. 
It can effectively end a sentence, where the release is renewed, 
and the conditions of temporary release are abided by. However, 
it is also used for short periods of time, perhaps a couple of 
hours or a day or a few days. It was introduced in 1960 by the 
Criminal Justice Act of that year and is very much associated 
with the then Parliamentary Secretary or Junior Minister, 
Charles Haughey, in his first ministerial role. It was a 
progressive piece of legislation introduced to assist prisoners in 
their reintegration and preparation for release and also as a 
humanitarian measure to allow a prisoner to go home in times of 
crisis or particular importance. 

The legislation was amended in 2003 by another Minister with a 
zeal for reform, Michael McDowell. The Criminal Justice 
(Temporary Release of Prisoners) Act 2003 lays down various 
factors which must be taken into account when making a 
decision whether or not to grant a prisoner temporary release. 
These include the nature and gravity of the offence, the period 
of sentence, the potential threat to the safety and security of the 
public, including the victim of the original crime, the risk of 
failing to return and so on. This power is delegated to the Irish 
Prison Service.  

When a prisoner applies for temporary release, the decision-
making process can be opaque. Though no formal studies have 
been conducted, prisoners and practitioners report receiving 
little information as to why a particular decision to refuse TR 
has been arrived at. A key difficulty is that, without reasons, a 
prisoner is in the position of being largely unable to challenge 
the information or know the source of it.  

The extent to which the family rights of a prisoner are 
considered in a decision to grant temporary release is also 
somewhat unclear. In this respect, if family rights or children’s 
interests are at issue in a decision to refuse temporary release, it 
would be prudent for the decision maker to record that these 
interests were taken into account and how they were outweighed 
by other interests. It is not clear that this is done routinely at 
present.  

The European Court of Human Rights decision in Ploski v. 
Poland is relevant here. There, the applicant sought leave to 
attend the funerals of his mother and father. This was refused. 
The European Court of Human Rights found that the refusal 
amounted to a breach of Article 8. Though there was not an 
unconditional right to attend a funeral of a relative, refusal 
should be the response only if there were compelling reasons 
and there were no alternative solutions like escorted leave.  

It is firmly established in both Irish and Convention decisions 
that temporary release is a privilege and not a right. If temporary 
release is being revoked, a basic duty to give reasons clearly 
applies. If it is merely refused, much less is required under the 
current Irish position. The caselaw is by no means clear cut, but 
the Irish courts have yet to establish that there is even a limited 
right to make representations or see the information upon which 
the refusal was based (which would be subject of course, to 
security concerns). However, the much celebrated Supreme 
Court decision in Mallak concerning the duty to give reasons in 
a different context may well yet give rise to a decision that, even 
where the privilege of temporary release is in issue, a duty to 
give reasons applies. In a perhaps unexpected decision,  Article 
6 of the Convention has been found not to be engaged in 
decisions on temporary release following Boulois v. 
Luxembourg.  

The concern here is that decisions on temporary release can 
impinge upon fundamental matters such as the rights of 
children, and indeed rehabilitation. As such, the rule of law 
requires, I argue, that basic fair procedure rights should apply.  

On the question of rehabilitation,  the European Court of Human 
Rights is moving very close to establishing that there is a right 
to the opportunity for rehabilitation in its decisions in Vinter v 
UK concerning the reviewability of whole life orders or 
sentences. I would like to draw attention to one passage from the 
concurring opinion of Judge Ann Power-Forde in that case.  

Judge Power-Forde considered that Article 3, the right to be free 
from torture and/or inhuman and degrading treatment, 
encompassed a ‘right to hope’. Judge Power-Forde went on:  

Those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious of 
acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others, 
nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry 
within themselves the capacity to change. Long and 
deserved though their prison sentences may be, they retain 
the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for 
the wrongs which they have committed. They ought not to 
be deprived entirely of such hope. To deny them the 
experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect 
of their humanity and, to do that, would be degrading. 

This is a remarkable statement and an indication of the direction 
in which the European Court of Human Rights is going 
concerning rehabilitation. The possible implication is that 
refusal to provide rehabilitative programmes may also give rise 
to fair procedure rights. 

Restrictions on visits  

Another area which involves the rights of those affected by 
imprisonment, not just prisoners themselves, and which can 
have a profound effect on the process of reintegration is the 
denial of contact between a prisoner and his or her visitors, 
particularly children. 

The default position in the Irish Prison Rules is that visits should 
be what is known as ‘screened’, i.e. with a transparent partition 
between visitor and prisoner. That is the default position in law, 
though the position in practice is that in many institutions visits 
are not screened, unless there is some reason to do so.  

A prisoner who is placed on a screened visit faces a huge hurdle 
in challenging that decision as a result of the High Court 
judgment in Foy v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison. There the 
High Court held that the default position of screening then in 
place in Cloverhill was reasonable, and was most deferential to 
the views of the prison governor. The decision is in considerable 
contrast to the position under the Convention which requires a 
specific security risk to be necessary to justify such a restriction 
on contact.  

Much has been happening within the Irish Prison Service which 
is progressive and sensible in the last couple of years, and credit 
must be given to its new Director General. In April of this year 
the Irish Prison Service announced that unscreened visits would 
be piloted in areas where visits had previously been screened, in 
an example of practice moving ahead of the law and the 
Constitution. 

However, an area where access to basic fair procedures is sorely 
lacking concerns the denial of visits. The Irish Prison Service 
must, of course, act to ensure that contraband does not enter our 
prisons to the greatest extent possible, and this concern often 
drives the imposition of bans and restrictions on visits. 
However, the practice of imposing open-ended bands on a 
visitor, without the provision for review by the Irish Prison 
Service, is a major concern. The Prison Rules give a Governor 
very wide discretion to refuse a person access to a prison. 
However, there is no provision in legislation concerning review 
or the length of bans imposed. The European Court of Human 
Rights has emphasised the need for careful reviews of bans, and 
clarity concerning when bans can be imposed, especially where 
children are affected (if a parent or guardian of a child is the 
person banned). Again, when reasons are not forthcoming or are 





A prisoner who is faced with a rejection of an application for 
temporary release, or a visitor who is banned from visiting his 
or her loved one has limited recourse in terms of appeal 
mechanisms. The general remit of the Ombudsman in Ireland 
does not apply to prisons. When the office of the Ombudsman 
was introduced prisons were specifically excluded on the basis 
of fear that ‘subversive prisoners’ would swamp and paralyse 
the system.  

In effect, a prisoner seeking to challenge these kinds of 
decisions is often obliged to go down the arduous road of 
judicial review. This is expensive for the State. On the other side 
there are significant risks for the individual who, without legal 
aid require the goodwill, or appetite for risk, of lawyers. Often 
enormous work is involved.  

I look at the debates in England and Wales concerning changes 
to the provision of legal aid for cases taken by prisoners with 
both concern and, bizarrely, envy, for what they are being 
reduced to, practitioners here would be delighted with. It’s easy 
to be cynical about legal aid for lawyers, but it must again be a 
fundamental principle that if your rights are at stake, even or 
perhaps especially, if you are in the custody of the state, then 
your right of access to the courts and to justice must be 
effective. On this point, I think it is at least arguable that Article 
6 of the Convention is at issue when prisoners do not have 
access to a scheme of legal aid to challenge decisions to, for 
example, restrict their access to visits, or to rehabilitative 
schemes. Decisions in England and Wales give some support to 
this. 

It seems that, however, the UK government is moving to restrict 
legal aid further for judicial review and other areas, which has 
been censured by NGOS, but also the Joint Committee of the 
Houses of Parliament on Human Rights. 

Attending court  

Briefly, I must also mention the case of Brady v Haughton 
where the Supreme Court held that a person in prison is entitled 
to be present at the hearing of his action. While I understand the 
resource implications of bringing prisoners to the High Court, it 
seems an unnecessary infringement on the right of access to 
justice to have sought to argue that this was not permitted. In my 





A key aspect of the rule of law in prison is access to a 
complaints mechanism.  

There is a mechanism provided for in the Prison Rules whereby 
a prisoner can make a complaint about the conditions of  his or 
her detention. A complaint should be investigated by a senior 
prison officer and the Governor will make a decision, which can 
be appealed to the Minister. 

The Inspector of Prisons has criticised the complaints 
mechanisms in prison, noting that the prisoner is often not given 
the opportunity to present his or her case orally, or to rebut the 
evidence of others. The Inspector of Prisons cannot adjudicate 
himself on complaints. The Inspector has also noted a lack of 
confidence in the complaints mechanisms. Indeed the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, a Council of Europe 
body, noted a lack of confidence in Visiting Committees during 
its visit in 2010.  

Regarding effective complaints mechanisms, The boring tasks 
of recording, of taking meticulous notes of complaints, 
incidents, and responses are crucial. Justice can be served most 
effectively sometimes through the mundane.  

Progress, has, however again been made in the case of the most 
serious kinds of complaint – those of allegations of actions 
which may constitute a criminal offence, assaults, the use of 
excessive force or ill-treatment, racial abuse, intimidation. Since 
last year, an investigator external to the prison is appointed to 
examine the complaint, and the Inspector has general oversight 
of the investigations. 

Concerns have also been raised about the investigation of 
incidents of assault or abuse by other prisoners, particularly the 
lack of investigation of allegations by the police. An inadequate 
mechanism for investigating complaints made in settings so far 
from the public gaze imperils the rule of law and requires 
speedy reform. 

Deaths in prisons 

Finally, the way in which deaths of prisoners are investigated 
raises critical issues of accountability and access to justice on 
behalf of the deceased person and his or her family. The 
circumstances of the death of Gary Douch in Mountjoy Prison 
in 2006, involving severe overcrowding, failures in respect of 
mental health care, and systems for transferring information 
which were not fit for purpose, are shocking and tragic. As well 
as this, however, Mr Douch's death raises the equally important 
issue of how deaths of those in the custody of the state are 
investigated. This is a well established principle under Article 2 
of the Convention concerning the right to life. The Irish courts 
have held that our Constitution contains an even higher level of 
protection for the right to life than the Convention. The report 
published by the Commission of Investigation led by Grainne 
McMorrow Senior counsel is comprehensive and contains key 
recommendations. However, the model of a Commission of 
Investigation is unwieldy in the prison context, requiring a fresh 
assessment of prison issues each time one is established. The 
extension of the powers of the Inspector of Prisons to 
investigate deaths of prisoners both in prison and on temporary 
release is very welcome. However, it is essential that the 
Inspector be given the powers of compellability and discovery, 
as the CoI had.  

As we have seen in the case of Gary Douch, delays in 
investigations into deaths imperil access to justice and the 
opportunity to learn lessons from previous failings. It was an 
important symbol that the Minister for Justice apologised to the 
family, which sets a different tone in penal policy, but we also 
need further reform to our law governing inquests, including a 
statutory scheme for legal aid for families at inquests into deaths 
of prisoners, and we need a statutory basis for narrative verdicts, 
whereby inquests can make findings concerning any systemic 




Adherence to the rule of law and enhancing access to justice in 
prisons requires the imposition of basic rights of procedural 
fairness in decision-making. It also needs the establishment of 
an Ombudsman for prisoners, and a mechanism for investigating 
the deaths of prisoners which involves families effectively and 
has strong powers.  

To conclude on what is at stake and to end on what I hope is an 
uplifting note, I will refer to the words of our own High Court 
judge, Judge Hogan in the case of Connolly v. Governor of 
Wheatfield Prison: 

 For even though prisoners may have strayed from the path 
 of righteousness and even though – [as with the case of 
 Mr. Connolly]– they may have severely and wantonly 
 injured other persons, the protection of the dignity of all is 
 still ... vital ... This is because the Constitution 
 commits the State to the protection of these standards 
 since it presupposes the existence of a civilised and 
 humane society, committed to democracy and the rule of 
 law and the safeguarding of fundamental rights. ... 
 All of us are, of course, sadly aware of the great failures of 
 the past and the present where these rights seemed and 
 seem like hollow platitudes. But this is not quite the point, 
 since it is by upholding these values and rights that we can 
 all aspire to the better realisation of the promise which 
 these noble provisions of the Constitution hold out for us 
 as a society. 


Thank you.  



 
